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Abstract
Two central problems in a fiscal transfer system relate to resolving
vertical and horizontal imbalances.  In the context of the setting of the
13th Finance Commission, this paper looks at the methodological
background of fiscal transfers followed by recent Finance Commissions
in India, particularly the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC).  It is noted
that in India, there is long - term stability in the share of states after
transfers in the combined revenues of the centre and the states.  It is
argued that this stability depends on linking the share of states in the
transfers, particularly tax devolution with the difference in the buoyancies
of central and states taxes.  In the context of horizontal imbalance, it is
argued that some of the recent Finance Commissions have implicitly
followed an axiomatic approach to tax devolution and brought in some
normative elements in determining grants.  In spite of large difference in
fiscal capacities, a high degree of equalization has been achieved. It is
shown, for example, that in the case of TFC recommended transfers,
nearly 88 percent of needed equalization was achieved while devoting
50 percent of transfers to resolving vertical imbalance. A methodology is
also developed to determine weights of  vertical and equalizing
components of transfers through devolution. In the case of the Twelfth
Finance Commission, the horizontal component of tax devolution is
strengthened by a scheme of equalizing health and education grants.1
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1. Introduction
With the recent  constitution of  the Thirteenth  Finance
Commission, issues of resolving vertical and horizontal imbalances in
the system of fiscal transfers in India have once again come to the fore.
The Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) submitted its Report [1] at the
end of 2004 in the backdrop of a severe fiscal stress affecting government
finances, particularly states finances in India. The Report contained, apart
from the recommendations concerning the core tasks of the Finance
Commission regarding tax devolution and grants, a detailed roadmap for
the restructuring of India’s public finances including an incentive linked
debt-relief scheme for the states. Government finances have shown
significant improvements since then. The targets of achieving a fiscal
deficit and revenue deficits under the restructuring programme seem
well within reach for the central as well as the state governments. Many
states have enacted fiscal responsibility legislations and others are
following suit. In spite of these achievements, the fiscal transfers system
in India requires further reforms concerning both its vertical and horizontal
dimensions. These concerns primarily revolve around the following main
questions:
1. Stability in Vertical Transfers: Vertical transfers should be
stabilized around an appropriate level. These should not be
continuously changed in favor of one side or the other. The
question assumes importance also because of likely impact of
the proposed goods and services tax (GST) on vertical imbalance
in India.
2. Composition of Transfers: The composition of transfers should
be changed towards grants as compared to tax devolution and2 3
within grants, larger emphasis should be on grants on statutory
basis as recommended by the Finance Commission (FC) rather
than grants at the discretion of the centre.
3. Gap-filling Approach to Determining Transfers: In the case
of horizontal transfers, the long-term criticism of the Indian
approach has been the so-called gap-filling approach in the
assessment of needs and resources by the Finance Commission
because of the implicit adverse incentives.
4. Measurement of Fiscal Capacity: In applying the equalization
principle, measurement of fiscal capacity of states is a key
requirement. The measurement of state level fiscal capacity in
India is proxied by estimates of the gross state domestic product
(GSDP) at factor cost. This provides an incomplete indicator of
fiscal capacity although the Central Statistical Organization
prepares comparable estimates of GSDP. We need a more
comprehensive indicator of fiscal capacity.
5. Determination of Relative Weights of Sharing Criteria:
The revenue sharing criteria used by the Finance Commission
account by far the largest share of transfers. However, the relative
weights assigned to different criteria remains by and large ad
hoc. There is a need to develop a more objective framework for
determining suitable weights for the alternative revenue sharing
criteria.
6. Bail-outs and Controls on Borrowing: In a system where
states have been borrowing heavily from the centre, there is a
built-in expectation that centre will provide a bailout from time
to time. This leads to strong adverse incentives for the states to
finance current expenditures through borrowing from the centre
and other sources and expect that either a gap-filling grant or a
debt-service write off will bail them out in future.
7. Growing Centralization of Expenditure on State Subjects:
This is an issue concerning the relative ambits of assignments of
the two tiers of governments. There is a clearly noticeable trend
of central government getting involved in progressively spending
more and more on subjects that are clearly under the Concurrent
or the State List in the constitution, sometimes through the state
governments and sometimes bypassing them.
This paper attempts to address these questions. Section 1
summarises the evolving fiscal scenario since the recommendations of
the TFC. Section 2 looks at the issue of resolving vertical imbalance in
the context of the proposed goods and services tax (GST). Section 3
looks at the horizontal dimension of transfers, particularly the equalization
methodology and its adaptation in India in an axiomatic framework guiding
tax revenue sharing. It also highlights the extent of equalization achieved
by the TFC recommendations by decomposing recommended transfers
into vertical, equalizing, and special needs components. Section 4 looks
at the considerations relevant for determining suitable weights for the
revenue sharing criteria used by the Finance Commissions. Section 5
discusses the equalizing health and education grants recommended by
the TFC and the need for strengthening these. Section 6 looks at the4 5
steps relative to borrowing by the states in the wake of the TFC
recommendations. Section 7 provides the concluding observations.
I. Fiscal Developments since the Recommendations of
the Twelfth Finance Commission
a. Empirical Back Drop
The TFC deliberated on fiscal transfer issues in the background
of severe fiscal imbalances affecting both the central and the state
finances. To reverse these trends, the TFC recommended a scheme that
provided for a major restructuring of government finances including the
borrowing and on-lending regimes for the states. These changes were
aimed at limiting the borrowing levels of both tiers of governments to
sustainable levels, removing the adverse incentives in the on-lending
mechanism, and maximizing growth by keeping revenue account in
balance and augmenting the saving rate. The evident progress towards
lower revenue deficits since 2004-05 also led to the elimination of public
sector dis-saving. This was accompanied by moderate interest rates and
increase in investment thereby leading to higher growth.  During 2001-
02 to 2006-07, the aggregate saving rate has gone up from 23.5 percent
to 32 percent. Nearly half of this increase comes from the turnaround in
the public sector saving, which increased from (-) 2.0 percent to 2.0
percent, a turn about of more than 4 percentage points coming from the
reduction in government’s dis-saving. This corresponds to a fall in the
combined revenue deficit from about 7 percent of GDP to a little over 2
percent during the same period.
Table 1 shows the profile of fiscal imbalance of the central and
the state governments, as indicated by revenue, fiscal, and primary deficits
from 1990-91 to 2006-07. Consistent with the restructuring plan suggested
by the TFC, there are clear signs that both the central and the state
governments are likely to meet the fiscal responsibility targets of reducing
fiscal deficit to GDP ratio to 3 percent. In 2006-07, the revenue deficit of
the states relative to GDP fell to a near-zero level.
Table 1: Fiscal and Revenue Deficits of the Centre and the States
(Percent  to  GDP)
   Fiscal Deficit Revenue  Deficit Primary Deficit
Centre States Centre States Centre States
1990-91 7.76 3.27 3.23 0.92 4.02 1.76
1991-92 5.50 2.86 2.46 0.86 1.47 1.20
1992-93 5.31 2.76 2.45 0.68 1.20 1.01
1993-94 6.93 2.37 3.76 0.44 2.71 0.55
1994-95 5.63 2.70 3.03 0.60 1.33 0.81
1995-96 5.01 2.62 2.47 0.68 0.85 0.79
1996-97 4.82 2.69 2.36 1.16 0.52 0.84
1997-98 5.78 2.87 3.02 1.06 1.51 0.91
1998-99 6.44 4.22 3.80 2.48 2.01 2.18
1999-00 5.35 4.67 3.45 2.75 0.74 2.36
2000-01 5.64 4.25 4.04 2.54 0.93 1.79
2001-02 6.18 4.21 4.39 2.59 1.47 1.47
2002-03 5.92 4.17 4.40 2.25 1.11 1.31
2003-04 4.47 4.46 3.56 2.22 -0.03 1.50
2004-05 4.00 3.49 2.51 1.16 -0.06 0.68
2005-06 4.11 3.20 2.59 0.48 0.39 0.70
2006-07 3.71 2.58 2.03 0.04 0.15 0.16
Source (Basic data): RBI and CSO.
Notes:  GDP  figures  relate  to  the  1999-00  base  series.  Figures  prior  to
1999-00 have  been  adjusted by  a  conversion  factor.
State fiscal data are taken from RBI and follow RBI coverage and definitions.
2006-07 data for the centre is RE and  for the states, BE.6 7
The fiscal deficit of the states has also fallen to below 3 percent
of GDP. These changes indicate that the revenue deficit and fiscal deficit
targets relative to GDP set out by the TFC for 2008-09 are well within
reach. With the fall in fiscal deficit ratio, the debt-GDP has also started
falling. For the centre, after reaching a peak at 63.8 percent in 2004-05,
it has fallen to an estimated level of 60.3 percent in 2006-07. The state
debt relative to GDP also fell in the corresponding period from 33.4 to
30.8 percent. The combined debt-GDP ratio has fallen by nearly 6.6
percentage points from 82.4 to 75.8 percent. Thus, although the fiscal
deficit to GDP ratio has fallen, the fall in the debt-GDP ratio is slower and
it will take some more years to reach the target of 56 percent of GDP as
set out by the TFC. That is why, it is important to continue to adhere to
the suggested reform path beyond 2008-09. As shown in Rangarajan
and Srivastava (2005), the adjustment period for reaching the debt level
relative to GDP at which it should be stabilized could extend beyond the
mid-thirties of the current century while maintaining the fiscal deficit of 6
percent of GDP throughout the period. It can be advanced by a few years
by achieving a higher growth rate but the broad message is that fiscal
responsibility targets will have to be adhered to for a long period.
II. Resolving Vertical Imbalance
An excess of federal revenues relative to its responsibility and a
corresponding deficit in the state accounts where expenditures exceed
own revenues is referred to as the vertical fiscal gap. The notion of a
vertical gap conceptually contrasts with a benchmark situation in which
responsibilities and resources perfectly match for the two tiers of
government. In federal systems, a vertical gap is often deliberately created
for efficiency gains that result from the relative assignments and fiscal
transfers that are used to close the gap or convert it into a balance. The
main justification for such transfers may be listed as follows:
1. Transfers may be purely passive responses to the asymmetric
decentralization of expenditure and revenue-raising authority
(vertical transfers).
2. These may be used to equalize the fiscal capacity of the regions
to avoid inefficient migration of persons and businesses among
regions and to foster horizontal equity in the federation as a
whole (Boadway et al, 2002).
3. These may also be used in conditional forms to neutralize fiscal
externalities imposed by regional governments on other regions,
as well as to achieve national standards in social programs and
to induce efficiency in the internal economic union of the
federation (Dahlby, 1996).
4. These may be used as instruments for insuring regions against
shocks to their fiscal capacities (Lockwood, 1999).
a. Some Analytical Considerations
The terms vertical gap, vertical imbalance, and vertical fiscal
imbalance are often used interchangeably in the literature. However, in
the more recent literature, following a normative approach, a distinction
is made between vertical gap, optimum vertical gap, and vertical fiscal
imbalance. Boadway and Tremblay (2005) and Dahlby and Wilson (1994)8 9
define vertical fiscal imbalance in revenue-raising as a deviation from
optimum vertical gap where the optimum vertical gap is a situation in
which the marginal cost of public funds is equalized across the levels of
government. In many studies, the allocation of spending responsibilities
is taken as pre-determined, and the issue is how revenue-raising and
federal-regional transfers should be designed so as to achieve a second-
best optimum in a decentralized setting, given that taxes are distortionary.
In Boadway and Tremblay (2005), the notion of imbalance is
related to the inability  to achieve a second-best  optimum in a
decentralized federation, and the distinction between the vertical fiscal
gap and vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) reflects that inability. Specifically,
the vertical fiscal gap is taken to be the optimal level of transfers when
the second best is achieved by a hypothetical central planner, or
equivalently a unitary national government that can take coordinated
decisions for both levels of government. A vertical fiscal imbalance is
then defined as any deviation whether positive or negative from the
optimal vertical fiscal gap. These deviations will occur in a decentralized
setting because of the fact that regional governments emit fiscal
externalities on one another (Keen, 1998) and are unable to coordinate
their decisions. The existence of a VFI will be an optimal response of the
federal government to this coordination failure between regional
governments, and will be efficiency-enhancing.
Empirically, separating VFI from the horizontal fiscal imbalance
(HFI) is quite difficult although it is attempted here in section IV in the
context of the TFC transfers. Bird and Tarasov (2002) observe that “…it
is important to understand that the two concepts of fiscal balance….-
VFI and HFI- cannot be cleanly separated. One way to think of VFI, for
example, is that it might be considered to be eliminated—that is vertical
fiscal balance is achieved—when expenditures and revenues (excluding
transfers) are balanced for the richest local government, measured in
terms of its capacity to raise resources on its own. Even if this is achieved,
fiscal gaps or VFI will of course still remain for all poorer local
governments. Generally, it is common to discuss such gaps instead as
HFI…” In section V, we follow the approach of taking the per capita
transfer to the richest state as the benchmark for calculating the vertical
transfers.
b. India: Long-term Stability in Vertical Imbalance
As shown in the TFC Report, in India there has been long -
term stability in the vertical distribution of resources after transfers. It is
remarkable that while the relevant ratios and shares have been adjusted
from time to time, there is a perceptible stability of the relative shares
of the centre and the states in the combined revenue receipts and
combined revenue expenditures. The main features of the resultant
vertical distribution of resources may be highlighted since the period of
the Seventh Finance Commission as follows:
a. Prior to transfers, centre collects on average about 63-64 percent
of the combined revenue receipts; after transfers, states get nearly
64 percent of the combined revenue receipts.
b. This enables the states to spend nearly 57 percent of the combined
expenditure on an average on revenue account. The centre spends10 11
about 43 percent of the combined revenue expenditure by retaining
36 percent of revenues after transfers by borrowing relatively more.
Table 2 summarises this picture for the period since the Seventh
Finance Commission.
Table 2: Share of States in Combined Revenues
(percent)
Average  (Award  Period) Revenue  Receipts Revenue
Finance Commissions Before After Expenditure
Transfer Transfer
Seventh 35.3 61.4 58.0
Eighth 34.6 62.0 55.7
Ninth 37.5 64.7 56.9
Tenth 38.6 63.0 56.8
Eleventh 39.0 63.9 57.1
  Source (Basic data): Indian Public Finance Statistics.
The Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) had suggested for the
first time an indicative benchmark of 37.5 percent covering all transfers
from the centre to the states with a view to achieving stability in the
overall transfers from the centre to the states. Given the historical trends
and the current relatively high buoyancies of the central taxes, particularly
the direct taxes and service tax, the TFC suggested a marginally higher
benchmark of 38 percent. The TFC also recommended an increase in the
share of states in central taxes to 30.5 percent of the divisible revenues.
There has been an argument that this share should be fixed in nominal
terms for a few decades or so. It can be argued that the objective of
stability will not be served by fixing the share of the states in the central
taxes in nominal terms as long as the central and the state taxes are
growing with different buoyancies. In particular, some upward adjustment
is needed if central taxes are growing more than that of the states. At
the present juncture this was justified as centre’s tax buoyancy is expected
to be relatively higher due to their exclusive power to tax the base of
growing services while for some time states will be undergoing
adjustments on account of moving to the state level VAT.
As detailed in Annexure 1, it can be shown that between any
two periods, the share of states in the total tax revenue of the centre and
the states after transfers will be constant only if the share of states in the
central taxes is increased by the margin by which the buoyancy of central
tax revenues exceeds the buoyancy of the combined tax revenues.  This
result can also be stated in terms of the buoyancies of the central and
the state taxes. Representing the respective buoyancies of state, central,
and combined tax revenues as b, c, and d and the share of states in
central taxes as t and t’ between two periods, it can be shown that the
share of states (or centre) in total tax revenues after transfers will be
constant between the two periods if
t’ – t = (c-d) g     (1)
where, g is the GDP growth rate.  If a is the share of states’ own revenues
in total tax revenues, this condition can also be written as
t’ – t = (c-b) a . g     (2)
This also implies that for stability, there should be no change in
the share of states if the buoyancy of central taxes is equal to that of the
states [2]. Adjustments are also needed if the central government changes
the size of the divisible pool by additional surcharges and cesses that are
not divisible.12 13
A scheme of assignment of resources, heavily in favor of the
centre purely for efficiency reasons, is always prone to lead to a
centralization of expenditures in direct and indirect ways. There is a
noticeable tendency in India for various expenditures in the concurrent
list, and often even if they belong to the State List, to be incurred by the
central government.
c. Vertical Imbalance and GST
Considering some important forthcoming tax reforms in India, it
is important also to recognize that the vertical imbalance would be affected
depending on the way the goods and services tax (GST) is implemented
in India. In Australia, the implementation of GST led to a substantial
increase in the vertical imbalance because the states agreed to forego a
number of taxes assigned to them in favor of a national GST. In India, the
2007-08 budget has mentioned the plan for implementing a National
GST by April 1, 2010. The exact contours of the plan for GST, which have
not yet been spelt out by the government, would have a significant bearing
on the vertical imbalance in the system. In this context, the following
three issues are of importance.
c1. Nature of GST Regime
First, it is important to determine whether the proposal is for a
central GST, or state GST or concurrent or dual GST. In the first two
cases, the pre-transfer vertical imbalance would increase substantially.
The options may be as follows:
a. Central GST:  In this case the GST is levied by the central government
and state VATs are all subsumed in this central levy. This would be like
the Australian model. This option would deliver harmonization by definition
as only uniform rates will prevail. The whole country would have one
common market and there would be no problems related to inter-state
trade. But this will increase vertical imbalance tremendously. States will
have to forego their power to levy a sales tax. A provision will have to be
made for distribution of the centrally collected VAT. Although a similar
arrangement has been implemented in Australia, it will have a significant
impact on the nature of fiscal federal relations. States will lose their
autonomy to fix rates and collect their own revenues. It is doubtful that
states will agree to such an arrangement. The scheme of redistribution
would also be required to follow a principle different from the one normally
used by the Finance Commissions so that states are adequately
compensated for the revenues that they would have otherwise earned
through the existing system of statevat or sales taxes.
b. Concurrent or Dual GST: This seems the most practical route as it can
be implemented while maintaining the current pre-and post-transfer
profiles of vertical imbalance. It would require that states be enabled to
tax services and the service tax rate should be the same as that for
goods. Alongside, central government should be enabled to tax value
added in the case of goods up to the retail stage. These changes would
lead to a comprehensive and unified system of taxation of goods and
services. The major problem in this case will be handling of inter-state
transactions. In the literature, three main solutions have been suggested,
viz., (a) system of compensating VAT (CVAT), (b) dual VAT, and (c) Viable
Integrated VAT (VIVAT). The system of compensating VAT (CVAT) is
also known as the Versano proposal. McLure Jr.(2000) suggested a14 15
modified version of the CVAT. In CVAT, uniform definitions and laws for
the tax base in all jurisdictions are needed. States are allowed however
to have there own tax rates with the proviso that all inter-state
transactions are zero-rated for state VAT. In addition to the central VAT,
the central government levies a compensating VAT for all inter-state
transactions. The rate of compensating VAT is common across states.
For inter-state imports, a system of deferred payment of state VAT and
credit for compensating VAT is then put in place. The Compensating VAT
is an additional federal level tax to ensure the tax revenues that might
otherwise be lost to cross-border tax evasion. One alternative to CVAT in
concurrent tax regimes is the dual VAT as practiced in Canada [see, Bird
and Gendron (2000)]. In dual VAT, central and state VAT rates are applied.
States have autonomy to determine the State VAT rates. The central
VAT is included in the tax base of the state VAT. States therefore have an
incentive to collect the central component, if they are asked to collect it.
The VIVAT system pertains to the exclusive state level VAT system.
c. State level VAT: This option takes one to the other extreme where the
GST/VAT is levied exclusively by the state governments. This also changes
the vertical balance equations drastically although in favor of the states.
The centre will then largely lose power to undertake transfers for purposes
of horizontal transfers. Even to provide centrally provided public goods,
it may need to have some sumptuary excises for itself. Otherwise it may
have to depend on reverse transfers. The problem of inter-state
harmonization and inter-state transactions will remain. For the case of
an exclusive state VAT regime, Keen and Smith (2000) suggested the
system of Viable Integrated VAT (VIVAT). In this case, for all intermediate
purchases, that is, sales between dealers, a uniform tax rate regime is
advocated for sales between dealers. This would be applied to transactions
within a state as also across the states. There is no central VAT or GST.
If the vertical imbalance in the system is not to be drastically
altered, the concurrent or dual VAT regime seems to be most relevant in
the current fiscal conditions of India.
 c2. Determining the Overall Rate
The second issue is to determine a suitable GST rate. At present
goods are taxed at the core rate of CENVAT at 16 percent (changed to 14
percent in the 2008-09 Central Budget) and State VAT of 12.5 percent.
This together would be very high although it would be less than 28.5
percent as the 16 percent rate (changed to 14 percent) applies to value
added only up to the manufacturing stage and the GST will have a larger
base.  The service tax rate is 12 percent. The suggestion of the Kelkar
Committee (2004) to aim at a 20 percent combined GST rate seems to
be a suitable target as it compares well with some of the international
GST rates. The highest GST rates are in Sweden and Denmark at 25
percent. At the lower end, Switzerland, Japan, Thailand and Singapore
have GST/VAT rates at 5 percent or marginally above.
c3. Determining the Central and the State GST Rate Components
The third issue relates to decomposing the overall GST rate into
its central and state components making sure that the relative pre-transfer
revenue levels are not disturbed. To achieve a 20 percent composite
rate, both tiers of governments have to jointly bring down the overall tax
rate, which at present amounts to 16 percent (14 percent from 2008-09)16 17
and 12.5 percent on the respective tax bases of the CENVAT and State
VAT as far as manufacturing and sales of goods are concerned. While
the tax rate on goods can come down, that on services, which is at 12
percent may have to be incrementally raised to bring it closer to the long
term desired norm. In the medium term, with a view to preserving our
federal structure, a system of dual taxation consisting of a state GST
(SGST) and a central GST (CGST) seems to be a viable option. The
Kelkar Committee had suggested a division of the overall rate of 20 percent
into a 12:8 ratio in favor of the centre. This may need to be reexamined
with current levels of revenues under CENVAT and service taxes and the
statevat and other related taxes that may be subsumed in the GST.
III. Resolving Horizontal Imbalance: Towards
Equalizing Transfers
In theory as well as practice, a system of equalization transfers
is considered desirable as it is consistent with both equity and efficiency.
The efficiency implications follow from two considerations:
(a) Locational inefficiencies that can result from inefficient migration
induced by fiscal surpluses is neutralized by equalization transfers;
and
(b) The redistribution implied by equalization transfers from the richer
to poorer states gives a return also to the richer states by avoiding
congestion resulting from excessive migration in the context of
services provided by these states that are in the nature of
‘congestible’ goods.
Courchene (1984, 1998) had argued that the efficiency case of
equalization depends on the existence of fiscally induced migration. If
there is no fiscally induced migration, there is no efficiency case for
equalization.  In a recent contribution, Dahlby and Wilson (1994) make
out a case for equalization on efficiency grounds even in the absence of
fiscally induced migration. They examine the role of equalization grants
as an instrument for maximizing a social welfare function or minimizing
the ‘excess burden’ of taxation. Optimal tax theory suggests that the
social cost of raising revenues depends not only on the size of the tax
base but also on the responsiveness of the tax base to tax rate changes.
They argue that it is important to use ‘responsiveness’ (or buoyancies in
the formula for equalization) rather than just the tax rate. The higher the
demand and supply elasticities to tax rate changes, the larger is the
marginal cost of public funds. On this basis they show that differences in
fiscal capacities, even in the absence of fiscally induced migration, are
sound grounds for arguing for equalization.
a. Equalization: Some International Practices
In Canada, the ‘equalization’ payments have been mandated in
the constitution since 1982, which commits the federal government to
the “principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”.
The equalization transfer to a province in absolute amount is determined
by applying the average revenue effort to the difference between standard
base and the actual base for that province with respect to the various18 19
revenue sources. This produces an estimate of revenue, which is higher
than the actual revenue for provinces that have ‘below-average’ capacity.
This exercise is done for all revenue bases used by the provinces (see,
for example, Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004a for a discussion). In the
Canadian system, there is no reference to cost differentials and the states
are free to use their equalized capacities in providing any mix of public
goods and merit goods. The equalization grants are supplemented by
health and social sector transfers that are equally important in volume
and are also of an equalizing nature.
The Australian system of equalization transfers (see, Rangarajan
and Srivastava, 2004b) goes into the question of cost differentials relevant
for comparison with some notion of equal efficiency in the provision of
goods and services by the provincial authorities. The guiding principle of
horizontal transfers system is fiscal equalization, which is defined by the
Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC)(2004) as follows: “State
governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and services
tax revenue and health care grants such that, if each made the same
effort to raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same
level of efficiency, each would have the capacity to provide services at
the same standard”. The Australian equalization differs from the Canadian
equalization due to the reference to efficiency and standard of services.
The Canadian system makes reference only to equalization in fiscal
capacity. In Australia, fiscal equalization looks at both the revenue and
expenditure sides. It may be noted that the typical methodology for
determining equalization transfers is not totally devoid of adverse
incentives, as discussed in some recent literature (e.g. Garnaut, 2002)
on the subject.
The ground conditions in India are different from Canada or
Australia in two critical respects. First, the extent of difference in the
resource bases is far larger than in Australia or Canada. For example,
the ratio of maximum per capita GSDP to minimum is 1.6 to 1 between
Ontario (leaving Alberta as a special case) and Prince Edwards Islands;
in Australia, the ratio of per capita GSDP of New South Wales to Tasmania
is 1.5 to 1. In India, this ratio between Maharashtra (leaving Goa as a
special case) and Bihar is close to 6 to 1. The second difference is that
the population that resides in the main ‘donor’ states as compared to
main recipient states is much larger in Canada and Australia.  In India, it
is the other way round. As a result, the amount of redistribution implicit
in the equalizing scheme is far larger when the recipients are more than
donors, making it extremely difficult to achieve full equalization. Thirdly,
there are large inter-state differences in cost conditions in India due to
differences in density and composition of population, nature of terrain
etc.
In India, the horizontal imbalance is resolved through a
combination of tax devolution and revenue-gap grants. In Canada, this is
done by grants. In Australia, this is done by sharing the revenue under
the Goods and Services Tax (GST) topped up by the Health Care Grants.
The Australian system has switched from grants to revenue sharing and
back from time to time. Some economists consider grants as the right
means of transfers. States themselves overwhelmingly prefer revenue-20 21
sharing. The transfer system in India has evolved in a manner that relies
on both modes of transfers. Finding a suitable combination is the relevant
problem.
b. India: Tax Revenue Sharing under an Axiomatic Framework
An explicit equalization methodology was not developed or
followed in India. Instead, an elaborate framework of tax revenue sharing
was developed supplemented by revenue-gap grants. This methodology
can also lead to an equalizing system of transfers if some basic principles
are followed. The evolution of criteria-based tax revenue sharing as
recommended by the Finance Commission can be interpreted in an
axiomatic framework. Fully equalizing transfers are a special case under
this axiomatic framework.   The following five axioms may be proposed
as desirable axioms for criteria-based revenue sharing: (a) Normalization
1, (b) Normalization 2, (c) Horizontal equity, (d) Comprehensiveness,
and (e) Neutrality. The two normalization axioms and horizontal equity
can give rise to a system of fully equalizing transfers.
Axiom 1: Normalization 1
If two states have the same criterion values, their shares should be
proportional to their populations.
Axiom 2: Normalization 2
The sum of the shares of all states should add to 1.
Axiom 3: Horizontal Equity
Between any pair of states, the state with lower per capita fiscal capacity
should have higher per capita share, and per capita shares should be
equal for states with equal per capita fiscal capacity.
Axiom 4: Comprehensiveness
In determining the share of any one state, information on all states should
be used. A corollary of this is that under each criterion, every state should
get a positive share.
Axiom 5: Neutrality
The allocation criterion should be neutral with respect to the
organization of States.  There should not be an incentive to bifurcate
states with a view to benefiting from the allocation mechanism.
These axioms are discussed in Annexure 2. It may be noted that
the Finance Commissions have endeavored to meet these criteria even
though they were not explicitly stated. The same cannot be said for
example of the dispensation criteria for determining grants under the
Gadgil formula. Under their deviation formula, states with per capita GSDP
above the national per capita GDP or average per capita GSDP get a zero
share thereby not satisfying the comprehensiveness criterion. Similarly,
Assam with a lower per capita GSDP may some times get a per capita
grant which is lower than Meghalaya, thereby violating the horizontal
equity criterion. Since shares under the individual criteria under the Gadgil
formula are not made public, it is not possible to subject these to a
critical review.
a. Measuring the Extent of Equalization: TFC Recommendations
For broad issues like those of resolving vertical and horizontal
imbalances, the fiscal transfer scheme needs to be analyzed in terms of
the combined effect of all components of transfer.  The total recommended22
transfers to the states may be calculated based on the projections of the
TFC regarding tax devolution and adding to these the grants already
specified in nominal terms. The grant profile tends to give larger grants
in the initial years, and to get a better picture of the inter-state distribution
of the recommended transfers, we have given the average annual
transfers by dividing total transfers by 5 and considering the average
annual transfers as centered in 2007-08. These are given in Appendix
Table 1 in per capita terms using state-wise population of 2001 Census.
The issue of determination of revenue-gap grants as ‘gap-filling’
has been raised by many authors from time to time. The concern arises
from the implicit adverse incentive for a state to create a history of
expenditure in the expectation of getting a grant later.  For the period
covered by the recent Finance Commissions, except for a very limited
number of general category states and for some years, the revenue-gap
grant is given mostly only for the special category states. The fact that
the special category states get a large share of the revenue-gap grant
follows from their large committed expenditures linked to the large plan
assistance that they have obtained in the past.
Let the per capita income (GSDP) of the states arranged in
ascending order of per capita GSDP be denoted by y1, y2 ……,yn and
corresponding population be denoted by N1, N2, ….. Nn.   If the vertical
fiscal is measured with reference to the richest state, in per capita terms,
it may be defined as [e-a.yn] (assuming that e>a.yn), where e is per
capita expenditure norm, a is the average tax-effort, and yn  is the per
capita fiscal capacity of the highest income state. If e is exogenously or
normatively determined, the total transfer to the highest income state is
given by
Nn. [e-a.yn].
Since every state gets at least the amount [e-a.yn] in terms of
per capita transfers, we may write total vertical transfer as
Ni [e-a.yn] = [e-a.yn] Ni    (3)
All other states have a lower fiscal capacity and would get an
amount, in per capita terms, higher than that obtained by the highest
income state in a progressive scheme of transfers under the axiom of
horizontal equity. The transfers to these states can be seen as consisting
of the vertical component equal to the per capita transfer to the highest
income state, an ‘equalizing’ component due to deficiency in fiscal capacity
and a residual which reflects cost disabilities and other special need
considerations.
Thus, for any state i, the per capita transfer can be decomposed
into three components reflecting (a) transfers made on account of vertical
imbalance, (b) transfers on account of equalization transfers, and (c)
the residual component. Thus per capita transfers to a state can be
written as:
t i = (e-ayn) + (ayn-ayi) + resi       for a state where resi > 0.           … (4)
Here, e is permitted per capita expenditure norm, a is average
tax effort, and ‘res’ is the residual reflecting other cost and special need
considerations. The term (ayn-ayi) represents equalization transfers. The
states may be divided into two groups: one where the per capita
recommended transfer consists of three components, vertical, equalizing,
23and special needs as given above. There may be other states, where
after vertical transfers are taken out, the balance falls short of equalization
entitlement and there is nothing left for special needs. Let the shortfall in
such cases be defi. In their case, we may write per capita transfers as
  t i = (e-ayn) + (ayn-ayi) -defi    (5)
In both cases, we can multiply the per capita transfers by
respective populations to get total transfers. By adding up the two sets,
we get the total transfers (TT) as
TT = Niti = Ni (e-ayn) + [Ni (ayn-ayi) - Ni defi] + Ni resi
Here, defi >0 for states that get less than their equalization
entitlement and resi>0 for states who get more than their equalization
entitlement.
The total transfers can thus be divided into three components,
the respective shares of which in total transfers may be written as:
a. Share of vertical transfers in total transfers: A1= Ni (e-ayn)/TT
b. Share of equalizing transfer in total transfers:
A2=[Ni (ayn-ayi) - Ni defi ]/TT
      c.   Share of transfers for special needs: A3= Ni resi/TT
We calculate below these shares for the TFC recommended
transfers.  In making these calculations, the following qualifications apply:
(1) Average per capita comparable GSDP at current prices for 1999-
00 to 2001-02, as used by the TFC, is taken as a macro proxy of
the state base for own tax revenues.
(2) Population according to 2001 census is used wherever population
is required to be used for conversions of aggregates into per
capita terms or vice versa. It may be noted that wherever
relevant, TFC had used 1971 population.
(3) The estimated per capita transfer of Maharashtra is used to
determine the vertical transfers. Maharashtra has the minimum
per capita transfer among all states.
(4) The all-state average tax-GSDP ratio is taken as 6.54 percent as
given in the TFC Report.
(5) Comparisons are made for transfers centered in 2007-08, which
is the mid-year of the TFC award period. Tax devolution is taken
as projected by TFC for different years and grants as spread out
for different years and the total is divided by 5 to obtain transfers
centered in 2007-08.
It is shown that the per capita transfers for the highest benchmark
state, viz., Maharashtra is Rs. 746.67. This multiplied by total population
of all states in 2001 at 101.209 crore gives total vertical transfer of Rs.
75570 crore. Total transfer recommended by TFC consists of Rs. 613112
crore of estimated devolution and Rs. 142640 crore of grants for five
years. Thus, the per year transfer is Rs. 151150.4 crore. As shown in
Table 3, vertical transfers constitute about 50 percent of total transfers.
We calculate below the degree of equalization achieved and the share of
transfers devoted for equalization.
24 25The equalization transfer is calculated and added for each state
as determined by   [Ni*(a)*(yn-yi)], where symbols have meaning defined
as earlier. In particular ‘a’ is the average tax price, which is equal to
average own tax revenue to GSDP ratio of the states, equal to 6.54
percent [as given in Annexure 7.9 of TFC Report]. The details of the
calculations and the related decomposition are given in Appendix Tables
1 and 2. A comparison of equalizing transfers plus vertical transfers,
called benchmark transfers with the TFC recommended transfers is
depicted in Chart 1.
Chart 1: Comparing Equalizing Benchmark Transfers with TFC
Recommended Transfers: General States
 
In Chart 1, the general category states (leaving Goa) are arranged
in ascending order of per capita income. It will be seen that the TFC
recommended transfers are progressive and follow the same pattern as
equalization transfers determined at the average tax price. It can be said
that for the general category states that, except Goa, the pattern of
transfers follows an equalizing approach and not a gap filling approach.
This is because, in their case the effective determinant of transfers is tax
devolution supplemented by equalizing grants on health and education
that supplement the equalizing content of tax devolution. At the same
time, vertical transfers are taken care of by the larger weight to population
criterion, the weights given to tax effort and fiscal discipline criteria and
a number of grants that relate to maintenance and special needs.
Table 3 summarises the relative shares of the three components
in total transfers, viz., vertical, equalizing, and special needs. Details are
given in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
Table 3: TFC Recommended Transfers: Vertical and Horizontal
Components
 (Rs. crore)
Total  Transfers (average  per  year  centered  in  2007-08) 151150.4
Amount  used  for vertical  transfers 75570
Share  of vertical transfer 50.00
Amount for equalization transfers 58738
Share of equalizing transfers in total transfers 38.86
Amount needed  for  full equalization 66740
Extent of  equalization  achieved 88.01
Amount  used for  cost  differential and  special  needs 16843
Share of transfers for cost diff and special needs 11.14
Source: Estimated  based  on  Appendix Tables  1 and  2.
26 27It is thus clear that 50 percent of total transfers are used as
vertical transfers. In spite of this large share for vertical transfers, 88
percent of equalization has been achieved when it is evaluated at the
average tax-GSDP ratio. A little more than 11 percent of transfers are
used for special needs that has gone mainly to the special category states.
This large degree of equalization could be achieved by introducing the
health and equalization grants, which use relatively a small amount of
transfer but improve the equalizing content of transfers significantly as
they go only to those states that are less than average in the per capita
health and education expenditure.  The TFC has made a new beginning
in this context. However, the gap covered was only 30 percent in the
case of health and 15 percent in the case of education. These ratios will
have to be increased to a larger extent to achieve full equalization.
Several qualifications may be noted in respect of the above
comparisons. First, the equalization benchmark is calculated with a
revenue side approach and expenditure side considerations are not
included. Secondly, a macro base reflecting fiscal capacity like the GSDP
is used. Thirdly, the highest per capita GSDP among states, excluding
Goa, is used as the benchmark. Fourthly, shortfalls from the equalization
benchmarks are equally weighted. Ideally shortfalls for lower income
states would require a relatively higher weight.
IV. Determining Relative Weights of Tax Devolution
Criteria
Considerable time is spent by the Finance Commissions on
determining the relative weights that should be attached to the different
tax devolution criteria, yet an explicit analytical framework has not been
spelt out for this purpose. Given the preceding discussion, it is possible
to develop a framework for determining suitable weights for alternative
devolution criteria. Given the benchmark for equalization (such as the
highest or mean income), the total amount needed for equalization gets
determined. Thus, the amount needed for equalization (horizontal
transfer) is given by
H= a. Ni(yn-yi)    (6)
Here, a is the average tax effort. The vertical transfer (V) may
be determined exogenously as it relates to the overall balance of
responsibilities and resources. Both the vertical and horizontal transfers
can be given through either route, i.e. grants or tax devolution. In the
case of both tax devolution and grants, three components can be
distinguished: vertical component, horizontal component that is equalizing,
and horizontal component reflecting other considerations. Suppose these
three components given through grants are referred to as gv (same for
all states), gh
i , and go
i. The latter two have different per capita amounts
for different states. The corresponding transfers through tax devolution
are, say, dv , dh
 i, and do
 i .
Thus, we have the following sets of decompositions:
ti= tv+th
i+to







where tv= gv+ dv, th
i=gh
i+dh
i, and  to
i=go
i+do
i                         (7)
28 29Let a share W of per capita devolution (=W.d) be given for (total
devolution D= d.Ni) equalizing horizontal transfers (using criterion like
the distance criterion), a share W1 of d for vertical transfer (under
population or similar criterion). The remaining part of devolution
constitutes a share W2, which is given for other considerations (like cost
differentials), where the three weights add to 1. W2 may be taken as
exogenously determined. Putting together the equalizing horizontal
transfers under grants and through tax devolution, the following condition
should be satisfied:
W.D + Nigh
i = a. Ni(yn-yi)
This can be solved to yield,
W.D = a. Ni(yn-yi) - Nigh
i     …(8)
Or, W.d = a.(yn- ì) – gh                                                              …(9)
Where, d is per capita devolution, yn is benchmark per capita
income, ì is mean income (=Niyi/(Ni), and gh is mean per capita
equalizing transfers given as grant. For the vertical transfer, we have
V= (Ni) [gv+ dv ] or the per capita vertical transfer is, v=[gv+ dv ].
Per capita vertical transfers given through devolution is
 (1-W-W2)d= dv                                                                     .…(10)
Using equations (9) and (10), we have,
(1-W-W2)/W= dv /[a.(yn- µ) – gh]
This can be solved to yield,
W= (1-W2)*[a.(yn- µ) – gh ]/[ dv + a.(yn- µ) – gh] ….(11)
Correspondingly d= [dv + a.(yn- µ) – gh]  /(1-W2) ….(12)
This indicates that given
(1) the exogenously determined average per capita equalizing
grant (gh),
(2) weight to be given to considerations other than vertical or
equalizing transfer in devolution (W2),
(3) the benchmark (yn) and average per capita fiscal capacity
(µ),
(4) the average tax-GSDP ratio (a), and
(5) the exogenously determined per capita vertical devolution (dv),
the weight that needs to be given to horizontal equalizing devolution
(under the distance or similar criteria) and the total amount of per capita
devolution may simultaneously be determined in order to achieve full
equalization.
In practice, in applying this to India, the tax devolution criteria in
India may be considered in three parts: those meant for vertical transfers
(population, and a large component of transfer under tax effort, fiscal
discipline criteria), those meant for equalizing horizontal transfers
(distance), and those reflecting cost disabilities (like area). The effort
and fiscal discipline criteria are efficiency-promoting modifications of the
population criterion and should be taken as part of the group of tax
devolution criterion meant for vertical transfers and the deviations may
be counted as part of the ‘other’ considerations.
Illustrating these considerations, with the TFC per capita amounts,
centered in 2007-08, subject to some approximations, Table 4 provides
30 31the relevant numbers. State-wise details are given in Appendix Table 3.
The numbers are derived in a manner consistent with the decompositions
given in equation 7.
Table 4: Illustrative Derivation of Weight for Equalization
(Amounts in Rs.)
gv gh go g
114.2 38.5 129.2 281.87
dv dh do d
632.5 541.91 37.18 1211.58
v h o t
746.7 580.4 166.4 1493.4
a.(yn- µ) 641.20  
Weight to horizontal equalizing devolution and per capita devolution
  Desired Actual (as per TFC)
W 0.47 0.45
D 1274.34 1211.58
Source (Basic Data): TFC  Report (2004),
Notes: Variables defined as in text; Amounts are in per capita terms.
It may be noted that the weight given to the distance formula in
the TFC  recommendations was 50 percent. However, since even in the
distance formula an amount is given to the highest income state, there is
a vertical component. The actual weight to the equalizing horizontal
component is estimated to be 45 percent, obtained by dividing dh by d.
The desired weight as derived for full equalization weight is marginally
more at 47 percent. In addition, this is associated with higher per capita
devolution amounting to Rs. 1275 instead of the actual amount of Rs.
1212. It may be also noted that increasing the amount of equalizing
horizontal grants would reduce the total amount needed for devolution
almost by the same margin since the term gh occurs in the numerator.
This would also affect the weight to the equalizing component of the
devolution formulae, but the effect operates through both numerator
and denominator. In general, increasing the equalization component of
grants makes it easier to achieve full equalization through devolution.
That is why, the equalization grants given in respect of education and
health, which was a new type of grant given by the TFC, but where
equalization was limited only to 15 and 30 percent respectively, needs to
be strengthened.
V. Equalization Grants for Health and Education
In devolution formulae, it is difficult to use the mean income as
the benchmark as states with per capita incomes higher than the mean
income will get a zero share in tax devolution. The practice followed by
the Finance Commissions in India has been to allocate a positive share
to all states. It is easier to use benchmarks with reference to the mean
of per capita incomes or service levels in determining grants for selected
services. In this context, the TFC introduced, equalization grants for
education and health with the aim of augmenting the equalization content
of fiscal transfers focusing on two high merit services.
In devising a grant that is specific-purpose and aimed at given
sectors, it is important to make up for the deficiency in resources but not
to underwrite the deficiency in priority accorded to the sector by the
concerned state government. The TFC methodology entailed the following
steps: a. derivation of the average preference for allocation to health
32 33and education (say a) and b. derivation of the gap of the state-specific
expenditure on the concerned service (education/health) from the
corresponding group average (general category/ special category states)
evaluated by applying the average preference to the state’s aggregate
expenditure. Thus for, any service, suppose that the group average per









Subscript i varies over the states belonging to the relevant group. The
per capita capacity of a state is given by r
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Actual gap in expenditure between a state and the group-average
can be seen as the sum of two components: one due to deficiency in
fiscal capacity and the other due to giving the concerned sector less than
average preference. It is only the first part, that is deficiency in expenditure
due to lack of capacity, that is taken into account while the deficiency that
results from giving less than average preference in budgetary allocation
is ignored. Thus, the actual gap may be written as:
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Thus, the relevant gap is reflected in the first term, which is due to the
deficiency in the fiscal capacity, given the average allocation to the
concerned sector. The second term is the difference due to allocating
less than average share given the capacity of the state, and this difference
does not require to be made up under the equalization principle. Thus,




). In estimating the
resources, r was proxied by resources devoted to expenditure excluding
interest payments and pensions. In the TFC scheme only 15 and 30
percent of the equalizing grants were provided in the case of education
and health. Clearly, there is a need for providing larger equalizing transfers
as this would ease the pressure on tax revenue sharing to accommodate
a large share of equalizing transfers.
VI. Discontinuance of Further Debt Relief
Recommendations in regard to debt relief were formulated in
the context of the overall programme for restructuring government
finances in the country. Debt-relief was linked to the states governments
meeting a set of conditionalities including enactment of a fiscal responsibility
legislation. According to available information, all state governments,
except two, have already enacted their respective fiscal responsibility
legislations.
Two major recommendations regarding the state level borrowing
from the centre were: one, to delink grants and loans in plan assistance,
and two, to discontinue centre’s intermediation for state borrowing. Once
centre’s intermediation is discontinued, the moral hazard in expecting
34 35periodic bailouts would also be eliminated or at least significantly reduced.
There is now no case for including a ‘debt-relief’ clause in the terms of
reference for future Finance Commissions. RBI has recommended that
states should go more and more for the auction route as it leads to price
discovery, promotes market discipline, and improves secondary market
liquidity. With some degree of flexibility in borrowing from the NSSF, the
states should be able to adapt to the new market-oriented regime without
much difficulty. In regard to the NSSF, the obligatory share of the States
has been reduced to 80 percent with effect from 2007-08.  RBI has made
arrangements so that State Development Loans (SDLs) are eligible for
repo transactions under the liquidity adjustment facility and it has been
decided to introduce the non-competitive bidding facility in respect of the
primary auctions of SDLs. While the centre’s intermediation has been
discontinued, loans and grants have not been delinked in plan assistance
except in the case of external assistance. This linking requires
reexamination on the part of the Planning Commission particularly when
the assistance is for social sector projects or for poverty alleviation where
the capacity to service the loan is not created as a result of assistance.
The TFC had also recommended the constitution of a loan council,
which may decide the overall annual borrowing limits for the state
governments. While a full fledged loan council has not been constituted,
some steps have been taken towards achieving the related objectives. In
particular, RBI has moved to set up a Standing Technical Committee (STC)
with representation from the Central and State governments and the
RBI.  The STC will make annual projections of borrowing requirements
of the State Governments, build alternative scenarios and suggest
alternative strategies and instruments for raising resources of States. It
will also advise a mechanism for annual allocation of market borrowings
among the States. It will take note of actual and budgeted borrowings of
the state governments, develop a suitable database, assess fiscal risks
from issuances of guarantees, and advise State Governments on various
issues relating to their borrowings.
It is useful to note that the reference to the debt relief clause
has now been withdrawn from the terms of reference to the Thirteenth
Finance Commission. This follows from the discontinuance of centre’s
intermediation in state borrowing and on-lending to states subject to
limited exceptions like the external assistance, which is also being passed
on back to back terms, except for the special category states.
VII. Concluding Observations
This paper has reviewed the fiscal transfer arrangements in India
in the context of resolving the vertical and horizontal imbalances. The
main conclusions may be summarized as follows:
Vertical Imbalance
In the literature, a distinction has been made between the
concepts of vertical gap, optimum vertical gap, and vertical fiscal
imbalance. In the context of the Indian transfer system, in resolving the
vertical fiscal imbalance, the following points have been made.
1. In India, there has been a long-term stability in the share of the
centre and the states in the combined tax revenues of the system
after tax devolution. It may be considered desirable to continue
36 37to maintain this stability as long as there are no basic changes in
the division of responsibilities between the centre and the states.
It is further shown that maintaining such a stability would requires
an upward adjustment in the share of states in the divisible pool
of taxes in periods where the expected buoyancy of central taxes
is higher than that of the states.
2. The proposed move to a national GST will have significant
implications for vertical imbalance. For maintaining the existing
extent of vertical imbalance, a concurrent system of GST is
recommended. The GST rates for the two tiers should be
determined taking into account the present level of revenues of
the two tiers from the concerned taxes. If, however, a central
GST is adopted, vertical imbalance of resources prior to transfers
will shift excessively in favour of the centre, and the resultant
vertical gap will have to be resolved by a corresponding increase
in transfers. This will also have significant implications for the
horizontal distribution of transfers.
3. For operational purposes, ‘vertical gap’ is measured in this paper
as the total transfer to all states. This reflects division of
resources between the two tiers of government without looking
into the inter se distribution of the share of states among the
states. With a view to examining the inter se distribution, the
transfers recommended by the Finance Commission are further
decomposed into (a) the vertical component of transfers (as
distinct from the vertical gap) indicating per capita transfers to
all states including the highest income state, (b) equalizing
transfers indicating the component of transfers only to the states
with a fiscal capacity less than the defined benchmark capacity,
and  (c) a  residual reflecting  special needs  and ad  hoc
components.
Horizontal Imbalance
In respect  of the horizontal dimension of transfers, the
equalization approach to transfers, which is followed by some of the
important federal systems like Canada and Australia, is suitable for India
also. While in Canada, attention is focused on equalizing revenue
capacities only, in Australia, this is complemented by a comprehensive
expenditure side equalization covering all services. In this context, the
following points are made:
1. Subject to certain assumptions, tax revenue sharing under an
axiomatic framework will result in transfers that will be consistent
with the concept of revenue side equalization used in Canada.
The difference is that in the Indian case, a macro base rather
than a tax by tax approach is followed on the revenue side.
While using a macro approach, there is a need to obtain a better
measure of fiscal capacity as GSDP at factor cost is an incomplete
indicator for this purpose. The Central Statistical Organization,
which prepares comparable estimates of GSDP for the Finance
Commission should be asked to prepare a more comprehensive
indicator of fiscal capacity taking GSDP at market prices and
providing supplementary information on remittances and others
influences that add to the spending capacity in different states.
38 392. A suitable methodology can be developed to objectively determine
the relevant weights in the tax-devolution formulae, given the
large share of tax devolution in total transfers, which it is not
easy to scale down and substitute by grants.
3. Using available information, it has been shown that contrary to
the contention made by several economists, transfers in India
are not necessarily ‘gap-filling’ in nature in the recent past, at
least for the general category states subject to the exception of
one or two states for some years. Taking the TFC recommended
transfers, it is shown that, under specific assumptions, systematic
elements of transfers constitute a high proportion of transfers:
50 percent of transfers are used as the vertical component of
transfers and nearly 40 percent is equalizing in nature, consistent
with the revenue side equalization approach. The remaining is
for assessed special needs and goes mainly to the special
category states.
4. It is shown that for achieving full equalization, subject to various
assumptions, the weight to distance formula should have been
marginally higher to ensure that an equalizing transfer has a 47
percent weight in total per capita devolution. In the TFC formula,
the 50 percent weight given to the distance formula provided
about 45 percent equalizing transfers. Further, this higher weight
should be combined with a higher amount of per capita devolution.
It is advisable to increase the amount of per capita equalizing
grants to reduce the necessity for using devolution to perform
this task.
5. In the present exercise, equalization has been viewed in terms
of fiscal capacity equalization only, which is the approach followed
in Canada. Considerations of cost differentials and efficiency will
modify the results.
6. Equalizing grants may be extended particularly in services like
health and education. These also provide cases where revenue
side equalization should be supplemented by expenditure side
equalization where cost and use disabilities should be fully
neutralized, extending the methodology suggested by the TFC.
Others
1. If GST is levied and collected as a central levy, the principles of
distribution of transfers to states may need to keep divisible
revenues of GST as a separate category. States would need to
be compensated on the basis of ‘return’ requiring estimation of
revenue foregone on account of sales and related taxes.
2. As on-lending to states from the centre has been discontinued,
there is no case for including a debt-write off clause in the terms
of reference to the future Finance Commissions as has been
done in the case of the Thirteenth Finance Commission.
End Notes
1. The subject of resource sharing in federal systems has important
theoretical underpinnings and the TFC Report also evoked a number
of responses from economists, an example of which is EPW’s issue
40 41of July 30, 2005 that carried contributions of some well known experts
on the subject. Notwithstanding several issues raised, in writing the
overview of these contributions, Amaresh Bagchi, member of the
Eleventh Finance Commission, observed in the summary of his
overview: “The Twelfth Finance Commission has broken new ground
in several key areas and made recommendations which, if fully
recommended, will have a far reaching impact on the finances and
functioning of government in the country at all levels.”
2.   If the power to levy the sales tax in respect of three commodities
namely, textiles, sugar and tobacco is reverted back to states, the
states’ share in the divisible pool of central taxes would be 29.5
percent. Until this is done, it will be 30.5 percent.
3.  Sometimes area of a state is considered as a scaling factor, but this
is more appropriately taken as a determinant of per capita cost,
which may be higher in states where large areas are sparsely
populated.  It may also be higher if population density is extremely
high.
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44 45Annexure 1: Vertical Stability and Relative Tax
Buoyancies
We examine the conditions under which the share of centre (or
states) in the combined revenues of the centre and states remains
constant over time.  The following symbols are used.
Central tax revenues prior to transfers: RC
State tax revenues prior to transfers: RS
Total Revenues:  R = RC + RS
The buoyancies of central, states and combined tax revenues are given
by c, b, & d, respectively.
Thus,
c = [ RC / RC].[Y / Y]   or  RC =   c.RC.Y / Y = c.RC.g
where  g = Y/Y is the growth rate between the relevant periods
Similarly RS = b.RS.g and R=d.R.g
Let transfers (T) be a fraction t of central revenues in the initial period.
T = t.RC
Share of centre after transfers in total revenues
Share (centre)0 = (RC – t RC) / (R) = [RC (1-t)] / [R]
After a given period let the ratio of transfer be t’.  The new
share of centre in total revenues will be
Share (centre) n  = [(RC +  RC) – t’ (RC + RC)] / [R + R]
             = [(RC + RC)  (1– t’)]  / [R + R]
             = [(RC + RC.c.g) (1– t’)]  / [R + R.d.g]
             = [RC (1+ cg) (1– t’)]  / [R (1+ d.g)]
The relative shares of the centre and states between the two
periods is constant of
 [RC (1- t)] / [R] = [RC {(1 + cg)}(1– t’)] / [R (1+ dg)]
              Or,     1-t  = {(1+cg) (1-t’)} / (1 + dg)
(1-t) (1+dg) = (1+cg) (1-t’)
Ignoring 2nd order terms, t’ – t = (c-d) g
Thus, if the buoyancy of the central taxes is higher than the
combined tax revenues, the ratio of transfer to the states will need to go
up between two periods in order to keep the relative share of centre and
states stable after transfers.  The extent of increase will depend on the
growth rate and the difference between central and combined tax
buoyancies. This condition can also be written in terms of buoyancy of
state tax revenues.
We have,  R = R C + RS
d R.g = cRCg  + bRS.g
d.R    = cRC + bRS
46 47d       = [c.Rc] / [R]  +  [b.RS ] / [R]
         = c [R – RS] / R + b [RS / R]
Let the share of states’ own revenues in total revenues be
 = RS / R
We have
d = c(1-) + b 
the condition of stabilization is
t’ – t = [c – {c(1-) + b  } ] g
        = [c – c(1-) – b  ] g
        = [c – c + c  - b  ] g
t’ – t = ( c-b)  g
Thus, an increase in the share of transfer is warranted provided
the central tax buoyancy exceeds that of states taxes for keeping the
share of the two tiers in total tax revenues stable.
Annexure 2: Criteria- Based Tax Revenue Sharing:
Axiomatic Basis
In discussing this axiomatic framework, the following additional
symbols will be used:
Ni = Population of state i
yi = per capita tax base of state i
si = share of the ith state
s*i= corresponding per capita share
Si = total transfer in absolute amount received by a state under
a criterion
S*i= per capita transfers received by a state in absolute amount
by a state
Let the number of states be ‘n’. States are arranged in ascending
order of per capita tax base, i.e.
y1<y2<……<yn
The per capita macro tax base (yi) is approximated by the
comparable per capita GSDP in determining Finance Commission
transfers. We can write the state shares and per capita shares under the
well known population and distance criterion as given below:
Population criterion: share of ith state = qi (say)= Ni/Ni  and per
capita share as q*i= 1/Ni
Distance criterion: share of ith state = ai (say) = Ni(yn-yi)  /Ni.(yn-yi)
and per capita share as a*i = (yn-yi)  /Ni.(yn-yi). The state shares and
per capita shares can be written in more general form as follows.
Let the per capita share of a state in an allocation mechanism be
a function of  per capita income (tax base)  and a set of other variables.
The set of variables used in a criterion is referred to in a general way by
f(.). Let this be normalized by a function written as . Thus, the per
capita share of the ith state is
s*i =  fi(.)  .…(A1)
48 49Correspondingly, the share for the state as a whole is given by
si =  fi(.)Ni  .…(A2)
The total and per capita transfers in absolute amounts can be written as
Si= .fi(.)N.T and S*i= .fi(.)T  .…(A3)
where T is the total amount of transfers.
Axiom 1: Normalization  1
If two states have the same criterion values, their shares should be
proportional to their populations.
The entitlement of a state under any criterion should be
determined in per capita terms. If two states have the same value of the
allocation variable, but different sizes of population, the share of the
state with the larger population should be larger by the ratio by which its
population is larger compared to the other state. The basic consideration
here is that all transfers are aimed at citizens residing in the state, because
all services are meant for the citizens. Population is the appropriate scaling
factor in this context. This axiom means that, for two states i and j,
si /sj = Ni/Nj             if    fi(.) =   fj(.)  .…(A4)
Axiom 2: Normalization 2
The sum of the shares of all states should add to 1.
Under any criterion, the share of all states should  add to 1.  This
axiom ensures  that the entire sum to be transferred to the states as a
whole  would be precisely exhausted among the  states.  If the total
amount of transfer is T, we require  that the sum of transfers received by
each state should  be equal to the total amount  T, i.e. the transfer
received  by each state  is equal to  (si.T)
Therefore,
s1T+s2T +……+snT = T  .…(A5)
siT = T   or  si= 1
Thus,   .fi(.)Ni =1   or  = 1/fi(i)Ni  .…(A6)
For a given set of Ni, and values of variables entering f(.),  
could be taken as given. This axiom also ensures that all allocation criteria
satisfying it would be indifferent with respect to scalar changes in
population.  If population of all states increase by a factor ‘k’, we have
the new set of shares, given as indicated below:
fi(.)(kNi)/fi(.)kNi = fi(.)Ni/fi(.)Ni = si,
so long as population is not a variable  entering fi(.)
Axiom 3: Horizontal Equity
Between any pair of states, the state with lower per capita fiscal capacity
should have higher per capita share, and per capita shares should be
equal for states with equal per capita  fiscal capacity.
The allocation mechanism should be consistent with horizontal
equity.   Horizontal equity requires that the allocation mechanism should
treat equally two states if their criterion values are the same. It should
treat them differently if their criterion values are different. This implies
50 51that if two states have the same per capita fiscal capacity, they would
receive the same per capita share, and if the two states have different
per  capita fiscal capacities, states with the lower fiscal capacity would
get a higher share. A criterion that satisfies this characteristic may be
referred to as a progressive transfers mechanism, which ensures that a
poorer state receives a higher per capita transfer according to the specified
criterion.  The poorer the state, the lower is its fiscal capacity to raise
own resources if these are assessed at a common tax effort. This condition
requires that for a pair of state, bi and bi+1, where they have been
arranged in an ascending order of per  capita income if,
bi<bi+1,    s*i>s*i+1
and if    bi =bi+1,    s*i  = s*i+1.
Considering the case where no two per capita incomes are equal, we
require, for progressivity,
 fi(.) >  fi+1(.)
or  fi(.)/fi+1(.) > 1 or fi(.) – fi+1(.)>0  .…(A7)
Since fi(.) among other variables is also a function of per capita income,
we may write
s*i>s*i+1,        if s*i/yi =  f(.)/yi < 0, for a given value of .
Axiom 4: Comprehensiveness
In determining the share of any one state, information on all states should
be used.  A corollary of this is that under each criterion, every state
should get a positive share.
The Finance Commissions have followed the practice that under
no criterion, any state is given a zero share. This implies that information
on all states is always considered together. The shares of any subsets of
states are not to be determined independently ignoring relevant
information pertaining to the remaining states. Suppose that some state
(j) receives a zero share in the allocation mechanism.  In this case,
s*j =  fj(.) = 0
and  sj =  fj(.) Nj =0 or fj(.) Nj =0 since   0
The normalization axiom indicates that
1/   = fi(.) Ni +…..+fn(.) Nn  .…(A8)
If for some j, fj(.)Nj = 0, it will not enter in the allocation formula.
As such no information on the  jth state would enter into the allocation
formula.   Thus, to ensure that information on all states are used in the
allocation exercise, we require,
s* i > 0 for all  i
However if f(.) itself contains the relevant information of the jth
state, in the criterion values of all the states, the share of the jth state
can still be set at zero.
Axiom 5: Neutrality
The allocation criterion should be neutral with respect to the organization
of States.  There should not be an incentive to bifurcate states with a
view to benefiting from the allocation mechanism.
52 53As shown below, all non-linear criteria implicitly give an incentive
either for splitting a state into smaller states or for regrouping a state
into larger states. All convex and progressive allocation criterion provide
an incentive for a poorer region in a state to break off and form a ‘new’
state.  If it does so, with its lower per capita income, it would ensure  a
higher per capita share in the transfer mechanism.  Such fissiparous
tendencies can however be neutralized by providing a mechanism of
allocation of resources, which is neutral to the organization of the states.
However, even with such an intra-state mechanism, some of the devolution
criteria may not be neutral to the organization of the states under certain
conditions.  Consequently, they may encourage either disintegration of
states into smaller units or their integration into larger units.  It is a
desirable property for a devolution criteria to be neutral to the organization
of states.  The conditions required for this purpose may be stated as
below:
If, for any state i, if there are two regions 1 and 2, with per
capita income y1
i and y2











Neutrality of an allocation formula would require that the sum of
transfer received by the two regions as separate states should be equal
to the transfer received by the undivided state. We have
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The total number of states now being (n+1), neutrality thus requires;
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 i] = .fi(.)Ni  .…(A9)
An alternative way, in which this axiom could be stated is that
under  the allocation mechanism, no two states should either gain or
lose if they joined up to  form an integrated state.   The neutrality axiom
ensures that by itself, the devolution criteria  do not give any incentives
for states to bifurcate themselves or for two states to join together. The
devolution criterion should be neutral to the existing organization of states
as a datum.
Considering two important examples of specific criteria in use,
namely the population criterion and distance criterion, we can specify
the values of  and fi(.) for each criterion as given below.
For Population Criterion:
si = qi; f(.) =1;  = 1/Ni
For Distance Criterion
si =ai; f(.) = yn-yi;  =1/(yn-yi)Ni
Using these axioms for analyzing the devolution criteria used by
recent Commissions it can be ascertained that all criteria used by TFC,
namely, population, distance, area, tax effort, and fiscal discipline meet
the two normalization axioms. These also meet the comprehensiveness
axiom in the sense that information about all states is used to determine
54 55the share of any one state under all the criteria. The distance criterion
meets the horizontal equity axiom. The population criterion and the pure
form (where highest per capita income gets a zero share) of the distance
criterion also meet the neutrality axiom under certain conditions (for a
detailed discussion, see Srivastava and Aggarwal, 2000).
It may be noted that tax shares of different states under individual
criterion are not published in some of the other transfer exercises such
as those under the Gadgil formula. While in some components, the axioms
may be satisfied, in other cases, these may not be satisfied. It will be
useful if the Planning Commission makes public the state-wise indices
under different components of the criteria used under the Gadgil formula
for a more informed debate on the subject.
Appendix Table 1: Comparison of Equalization Transfers Based on
Available Data with TFC Recommended Transfers
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bihar 8.300 6539 20455 1337.8 2084 1821.5
Uttar Pradesh 16.620 10798 16196 1059.2 1806 1605.0
Orissa 3.680 11234 15760 1030.7 1777 2006.0
Jharkhand 2.695 11717 15277 999.1 1746 1754.6
Assam 2.666 12288 14706 961.8 1708 1824.2
Madhya Pradesh 6.035 13340 13654 893.0 1640 1534.0
Chhattisgarh 2.083 13710 13284 868.8 1615 1752.9
Rajasthan 5.651 15059 11935 780.5 1527 1381.5
Meghalaya 0.232 16035 10959 716.7 1463 3765.5
Arunachal Pradesh 0.110 16579 10415 681.1 1428 6419.1
Uttaranchal 0.849 16998 9996 653.7 1400 2871.7
Manipur 0.217 17264 9730 636.3 1383 6339.5
West Bengal 8.018 17377 9617 629.0 1376 1268.2
Jammu & Kashmir 1.014 18132 8862 579.6 1326 4217.5
Andhra Pradesh 7.621 18869 8125 531.4 1278 1320.4
Tripura 0.320 18974 8020 524.5 1271 5260.7
Nagaland 0.199 20469 6525 426.7 1173 7489.5
Karnataka 5.285 20703 6291 411.4 1158 1188.0
Sikkim 0.054 20929 6065 396.7 1143 6759.6
Mizoram 0.089 21245 5749 376.0 1123 10488.1
Tamil Nadu 6.241 22587 4407 288.2 1035 1174.9
Gujarat 5.067 22708 4286 280.3 1027 1010.1
Kerala 3.184 22824 4170 272.7 1019 1230.7
Himachal  Pradesh 0.608 24762 2232 146.0 893 4754.1
Haryana 2.114 26256 738 48.3 795 760.2
Maharashtra 9.688 26994 0 0.0 747 746.7
Punjab 2.436 28030 0 0.0 747 1057.3
Goa 0.135 56599 0 0.0 747 2557.6
Total



























Source (Basic Data): Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, 2004.
Note: Vertical component is equal to the per capita recommended transfer to Maharashtra.
This  is the minimum  per capita transfer  among  all states.Equalization transfers are
calculated by  applying the  average all-state tax-rate  to the  difference between the
three state average per capita GSDP(Maharashtra, Punjab and Goa) and the per capita
GSDP of any given state.
56 571 2 3 4 5 6
Bihar 1821.5 746.7 1074.8 0.0 263.0
Uttar Pradesh 1605.0 746.7 858.3 0.0 200.9
Orissa 2006.0 746.7 1030.7 228.7 0.0
Jharkhand 1754.6 746.7 999.1 8.8 0.0
Assam 1824.2 746.7 961.8 115.8 0.0
Madhya Pradesh 1534.0 746.7 787.3 0.0 105.6
Chhattisgarh 1752.9 746.7 868.8 137.5 0.0
Rajasthan 1381.5 746.7 634.9 0.0 145.7
Meghalaya 3765.5 746.7 716.7 2302.1 0.0
Arunachal  Pradesh 6419.1 746.7 681.1 4991.2 0.0
Uttaranchal 2871.7 746.7 653.7 1471.2 0.0
Manipur 6339.5 746.7 636.3 4956.5 0.0
West Bengal 1268.2 746.7 521.6 0.0 107.4
Jammu & Kashmir 4217.5 746.7 579.6 2891.3 0.0
Andhra  Pradesh 1320.4 746.7 531.4 42.4 0.0
Tripura 5260.7 746.7 524.5 3989.5 0.0
Nagaland 7489.5 746.7 426.7 6316.1 0.0
Karnataka 1188.0 746.7 411.4 29.9 0.0
Sikkim 6759.6 746.7 396.7 5616.3 0.0
Mizoram 10488.1 746.7 376.0 9365.4 0.0
Tamil Nadu 1174.9 746.7 288.2 140.0 0.0
Gujarat 1010.1 746.7 263.4 0.0 16.9
Kerala 1230.7 746.7 272.7 211.3 0.0
Himachal  Pradesh 4754.1 746.7 146.0 3861.5 0.0
Haryana 760.2 746.7 13.5 0.0 34.7
Maharashtra 746.7 746.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Punjab 1057.3 746.7 0.0 310.7 0.0
Goa 2557.6 746.7 0.0 1810.9 0.0
Source (Basic  Data): TFC Report and  Estimates.
Note: Equalization component is calculated by comparing actual recommended transfer net of
vertical component with benchmark equalization transfer (col. 5 of Appendix Table 1). If the actual
transfer net of vertical component is more than benchmark equalization transfer, the benchmark
equalization transfer is entered in column 4. The excess becomes the residual given in column 5.



















1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Bihar 114.2 78.0 0.0 632.5 996.8 0.0
Uttar Pradesh 114.2 69.5 0.0 632.5 788.8 0.0
Orissa 114.2 60.1 112.3 632.5 970.6 116.4
Jharkhand 114.2 102.1 8.8 632.5 897.0 0.0
Assam 114.2 106.1 115.8 632.5 855.7 0.0
Madhya Pradesh 114.2 56.2 0.0 632.5 731.1 0.0
Chhattisgarh 114.2 50.7 26.0 632.5 818.1 111.5
Rajasthan 114.2 50.2 0.0 632.5 584.7 0.0
Meghalaya 114.2 41.8 1647.6 632.5 674.9 654.5
Arunachal  Pradesh 114.2 39.7 3048.7 632.5 641.4 1942.5
Uttaranchal 114.2 38.1 1363.0 632.5 615.6 108.2
Manipur 114.2 37.1 4139.6 632.5 599.2 816.9
West Bengal 114.2 74.7 0.0 632.5 446.8 0.0
Jammu and Kashmir 114.2 33.8 2501.7 632.5 545.8 389.6
Andhra  Pradesh 114.2 31.0 -8.3 632.5 500.4 50.7
Tripura 114.2 30.6 3475.5 632.5 493.9 514.1
Nagaland 114.2 24.9 5729.9 632.5 401.9 586.2
Karnataka 114.2 24.0 15.3 632.5 387.4 14.6
Sikkim 114.2 23.1 1475.7 632.5 373.5 4140.6
Mizoram 114.2 21.9 7053.8 632.5 354.1 2311.6
Tamil Nadu 114.2 16.8 1.5 632.5 271.4 138.5
Gujarat 114.2 32.2 0.0 632.5 231.2 0.0
Kerala 114.2 15.9 74.3 632.5 256.8 137.0
Himachal  Pradesh 114.2 8.5 3578.3 632.5 137.5 283.2
Haryana 114.2 22.6 0.0 632.5 -9.1 0.0
Maharashtra 114.2 0.0 0.0 632.5 0.0 0.0
Punjab 114.2 0.0 289.2 632.5 0.0 21.4
Goa 114.2 0.0 86.8 632.5 0.0 1724.1
Average
(Population
weighted) 114.2 46.9 120.8 632.5 533.4 45.7
   Source (Basic Data): TFC Report, 2004.
Appendix Table 3: Decomposition of Per Capita Grants and










58 59Notes: The per capita vertical transfer (column 3 of Appendix Table 2) is
split between per capita vertical grant (equal to the lowest per capita
grant among all states (for Maharashtra) and per capita vertical devolution
(equal to the lowest per capita devolution, also for Maharashtra). All
states get these amounts. The equalizing components of grants and
devolution are calculated in two steps. As a first step, per capita equalizing
grants for all states are calculated by applying the ratio of Bihar’s per
capita horizontal grant (per capita total grant minus vertical component
of grant) to benchmark equalizing transfer (column 5 of Appendix
Table 1). Per capita devolution is also decomposed into three components:
vertical, equalizing horizontal, and residual.
The equalizing component of devolution is taken by comparing
two series. The first series is per capita total devolution minus vertical
component of devolution. The other is  the excess of the equalizing total
per capita transfer (column 4 of Appendix Table 2) over equalizing grant
referred to above. The equalizing component of devolution consists of
the lower number of the two series. This gives series 6 of Appendix
Table 3.  The residual of the devolution column is calculated as the total
per capita devolution minus vertical component of devolution (column 5
of Appendix Table 3) and equalizing component of devolution (column 6)
of Appendix Table 3.
Since the residual of grants and devolution should add to the
overall residual as shown by column 5 of Appendix Table 2, the residual
series for grants is derived as the difference between the overall residual
and the residual of the per capita devolution series (column 5 of Appendix
Table 2 minus column 7 of Appendix Table 3. This gives the residual
grant series (column 4 of Appendix Table A3).
Finally adjusted equalizing grant series (column 2 of Appendix
Table 3) is derived as per capita total grant minus per capita vertical
grant minus per capita residual grant. These procedures satisfy the
conditions of equation 7 in the text.
There are two negative numbers in columns 4 and 7 of Appendix
Table 3. These numbers may be adjusted by following a suitable rule in
calculating the residuals, but since the magnitudes involved are small,
further adjustment has not been done.
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